the care of the self

In the lectures from The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault discusses the theme of the relations between the subject and the truth. He introduces an ancient concept common in ancient Grecian society, the notion of epimeleia heautou, which means “care for oneself.” This notion is linked to another notion, gnothi seauton, or “know yourself.”

The two expressions go hand in hand as to know oneself, one must have care for themselves as well. To take care of yourself you must also know who you are, or “know yourself.”

He mentions Socrates as the main character in ancient Greek philosophy who really paid attention to these principles. He is described as a man who would stop people, old or young, and challenging them with questions to determine how much they knew themselves, and how much they were concerned with their selves.

The way Foucault interprets such notion is as a “desire for radical change, a sort of moral dandyism..” In opposition to the epimeleia heautou is the Christian principle of self-renunciation, the obligation towards others for the common good.

In the Socratic notion taking care of others is impossible if we do not first attend to ourselves, as I will explain later.

According to Foucault, the Cartesian approach is what caused for the epimeleia heautou to be “obliterated.” The “know yourself” instead became fundamental for any access to truth.

There is an intricate link between spirituality and philosophy when it comes to knowledge, access to the truth. The spirituality of subjectivity presumes that the person must change in order to access knowledge, that he must go through a transformation. The truth then gives beatitude to the subject. What gives access to the truth, is knowledge, therefore to “know oneself” is a necessary step towards gaining such access.

Such link was then destroyed by Theology, according to Foucault, who claims that it caused for access to truth no longer to be connected to the “spiritual necessity of the subject’s work on himself.”

Nineteenth century philosophy however still seems very much influenced by such “spirituality of subjectivity”, and there is a rediscovery of the “care of the self.”

The idea of spirituality as a condition for access to the truth is also interpreted in social terms, when discussing the subject’s class or political position, and whether these make him prepared to access the knowledge of, for example, Marxism or psychoanalysis.

Foucault then focuses in particular on the Socratic-Platonic moment, which is the first of three periods of philosophical reflection (the second is the period of the golden age of the culture of the self, while the third is the Christian asceticism, clearly opposed to the care of oneself.)

In the Socratic-platonic moment, the notion of care for oneself is first introduced. It was linked to a privilege, economic, social, or political. He takes as an example Alcibiades, and how Socrates demonstrates that he does not know how to achieve his goals, and it is because he doesn’t attend to himself. Without wealth or education, Alcibiades cannot govern a city, and guarantee the wellbeing of his citizens. Socrates helps Alcibiades see that what he is not aware of is exactly the object which he wants to take care of, or in this case, politics. He must take care of himself.

the invention of man

The readings for last week (sorry my post is a little late!) revolve around the central theme of “the invention of man.” Foucault discusses that philosophy is entangled with psychology and other human sciences, as the former marked a domain, which the “human sciences did not inherit…” , but re-established and confirmed in scientific terms. At the same time, human sciences are also defined by philosophy as sciences of finitude, or, in other words, philosophy confirms the truth of the human sciences. According to Foucault, psychology came to dominate the human sciences, because these all “became, in one way or another, sciences of the psyche.”

He also discusses that psychology is part of a larger episteme, or “worldview” structuring knowledge. Freud’s discovery of the unconscious is split into two separate interpretations, hermeneutic and “scientistic”. Psychoanalysis is linked to hermeneutics, as it approaches madness the same way hermeneutics approach literature, as texts “do not say what they say.” There are general laws of signification and interpretation. These are the normative aspects of psychology. However, we can never arrive to a definitive interpretation, a primary text.

In “Man and his doubles” Foucault defines the separation between being and representation. “It is no longer their identity that beings manifest in representation, but the external relation they establish with the human being.” The subject ‘s position with respect to knowledge is described as ambiguous, because we are objects of knowledge but also knowing subjects. We are speaking beings, but constrained by those things that are greater and older than us. We are constrained by our language, economy, and especially the body, for it is the mark of our limitations.

Finitude is the search for conditions that make all finite forms possible. The concept of “the same” is finitude’s own repetition. What is reflected empirically as a content is repeated on the transcendental level as a condition.

He then distinguishes two types of analysis , the transcendental dialectic, concerned with the social/historical/economic conditions that human knowledge depends on, and a transcendental aesthetic, concerned with the organic/physiological/neurological essence of thought. Both aspire to a truth that belongs to their discourse. This discourse is however ambiguous because it derives conditions from the objects it conditions. The solution to such ambiguity is a discourse that closes such gap, the “le vecu”(lived experience).

He talks about anthropological slumber, or the philosophical inertia caused by a dogmatism based on empirical knowledge.

Power and Subjectivity

In this week’s readings, we observe Foucault’s discussion of the legal treatment of criminals, and how much their psychological problems account for their illegal acts.
In “Birth of the Asylum”, from Madness and Civilization, Foucault describes the shift from a punitive system for the mentally disturbed, to a system which is more bent on curing such individuals. Taking as an example Tuke’s “York Retreat”, an asylum for the mentally ill, he describes a change from a prison-like environment to a more therapeutic environment. This change is given by progress in medicine and psychology, which began to interpret criminals and the mentally disturbed as having a medical condition, rather than considering them evil people.
There is both a religious and a secular interpretation of this change. The religious one, in Tuke’s contest, relies on the idea of the existence of fundamental goodness in each individual. We are all moral human beings, and the acts of transgression committed by some are only part of our superficial façade.
Pinel adopts a secular approach to such practice. He believes that religion does not comprehend all the wisdom and science necessary for the cure of the mad. He too believes that man is essentially good, and virtuous.
Both approaches are the result of a process of “subjectification”, in which subjects are no longer judged as criminals, but are individualized in the light of their own personal psychological condition.
In the First Lecture of Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, he explores the changes caused by this humanistic movement in the legal sphere. He describes the relation between punishment and proof, the evidence that a crime had occurred. The more certain and detailed the evidence, the greater the punishment. There is also a correspondence between the power of the evidence, and the authority of the person presenting such proof of the crime. The humanistic approach towards the criminal’s mental condition begins to really influence legal affairs by the 19th century.
The role of psychiatric evaluation of the criminal becomes more and more important, stating whether or not his act can be considered an offense for which he is legally responsible. By analyzing the subject, the psychiatrist defines whether or not he has a condition that causes him to be more likely to commit certain acts of transgression. This study allows to find ways of correcting his condition. Punishment shifts to the profession of curing. The penal system takes the responsibility of isolating mentally disturbed people, and of “normalizing” them.
The legal system as intended in this reading is also influenced by the idea that all men have are good, even though it is less evident in some. Through the curing process described by Foucault, the mentally ill have a chance to find their moral selves, and psychiatry serves to define what factors have brought them to become “less good.” Through a therapeutic process, the subject can establish a connection with his inner goodness, and determine the life experiences that caused him to be the way he is.